NewsEdit Europe’s New €150 Billion Defense Plan Raises Greek Concerns Over Turkey’s Potential Involvement
The recent approval of the SAFE regulation (Security Action For Europe) by the EU’s General Affairs Council marks a historic leap toward strengthening the bloc’s defense capabilities. At the heart of the initiative is a €150 billion financial instrument designed to bolster the European defense industry through low-interest loans to member states seeking to invest in military production and modernization.
But behind the political fanfare and ambitious scope of the agreement lies a growing concern within certain EU capitals—particularly Athens. The SAFE regulation, while advancing Europe’s strategic autonomy, opens the door—at least theoretically—to third countries, including Turkey. And that possibility has triggered alarm bells in Greece.
Turkey’s Role and Greek Reservations
Although Turkey is not explicitly mentioned in the SAFE regulation, the absence of a clear exclusion clause has provoked anxiety in Athens. For decades, Greece has viewed Turkey not only as a geopolitical rival but also as a direct security threat, especially given Ankara’s longstanding casus belli (cause for war) against Greece over territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea.
The regulation was adopted through qualified majority voting, bypassing the requirement for unanimity—a procedural fact that limited Greece’s ability to block the legislation outright. However, Greek diplomacy did not remain passive. Through persistent negotiations, Athens succeeded in inserting critical legal safeguards into the final text.
Key among them is a legal mechanism that empowers any member state to veto bilateral agreements between the EU and third countries wishing to participate in the SAFE program. This safeguard is grounded in Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which mandates unanimity for such agreements.
In essence, this gives Greece a significant lever: any future Turkish attempt to formally join the program would require Athens’ consent—a political improbability under current conditions.
Mitsotakis: No Cooperation Without Reversal of Casus Belli
Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has taken a firm public stance on the issue. “There can be no cooperation with a country that maintains a casus belli against Greece,” he has stated, underlining the condition he has personally conveyed to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
While diplomatic channels between Athens and Ankara have seen periods of thaw in recent months, the military and political distrust runs deep, particularly in the defense realm. For Greek policymakers, the prospect of European funds indirectly benefiting the Turkish defense sector is an unacceptable risk.
Loopholes and Trojan Horses?
Despite the robust legal framework now in place, several Greek military and diplomatic officials remain wary of potential loopholes. A major concern is the possibility of indirect Turkish involvement through joint ventures or consortia with EU-based defense companies. These partnerships, particularly with firms in countries like Italy or Spain, could theoretically allow Turkish technology or components to enter the European defense supply chain—what some in Athens fear could become a “Trojan Horse” scenario.
The regulation does attempt to address such risks. It limits the non-EU origin of components in funded defense projects to 35%, with at least 65% of the value of each product required to originate from EU member states, EFTA/EEA countries, or Ukraine. However, questions remain about the enforceability of these criteria and whether they are sufficient to prevent backdoor participation.
Strategic Autonomy vs. Strategic Ambiguity
The SAFE regulation marks a bold step toward the EU’s long-sought strategic autonomy in defense. It reflects a broader geopolitical shift triggered by the war in Ukraine, transatlantic uncertainties, and the desire to reduce dependency on U.S. defense imports. Yet this newfound ambition must navigate a labyrinth of national sensitivities, especially when it comes to historical rivalries such as that between Greece and Turkey.
Greece’s success in embedding key legal constraints in the SAFE framework is a diplomatic achievement. But it is only the beginning. The practical implementation of these provisions—and the vigilance required to uphold them—will be the real test.
As one senior Greek official commented anonymously, “The devil is in the details. And in Brussels, the details often get negotiated later, behind closed doors.”
Conclusion
The SAFE regulation opens a new chapter in European defense cooperation, with the potential to transform the continent’s defense-industrial landscape. Yet it also underscores the enduring complexity of intra-European politics, where shared ambitions must constantly contend with national security concerns and historical distrust.
For Greece, the challenge is twofold: to contribute constructively to Europe’s defense future while ensuring that strategic initiatives do not inadvertently empower those who pose a threat to its sovereignty.
And for the EU as a whole, SAFE may be a step forward—but only if the security of all its member states is genuinely safeguarded.